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DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE: THE IGNORED
GOAL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
JAMES E. COLEMAN, JR†
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the
people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these
depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislators
and magistrates, in all future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of
literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at
Cambridge, public schools, and grammar schools in the towns. . . .
Massachusetts Constitution of 17801
A free government can only exist in an equal diffusion of literature. Without learning, men
become savages or barbarians, and where learning is confined to a few people, we always
find monarchy, aristocracy, and slavery.
Benjamin Rush2

I. INTRODUCTION
For the last two decades, the University of Texas at Austin (the
“University”) has struggled to increase its enrollment of racial minorities. In
1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
University’s program of explicitly considering an applicant’s race was
unconstitutional.3 In response, the University adopted a race-blind admissions
program. To increase minority enrollment by taking advantage of the racial
segregation of Texas’ secondary schools, the Texas State Legislature adopted the
Top Ten Percent Law.4 Under that legislation, all Texas students in the top 10%
of their high school graduating class were automatically admitted to any state
public college, including the University. In the last year of this race-blind
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1. MASS. CONST. Ch. 5, § 2.
2. BENJAMIN RUSH, A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE DIFFUSION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA; TO WHICH ARE ADDED, THOUGHTS UPON THE MODE OF EDUCATION
PROPER IN A REPUBLIC. ADDRESSED TO THE LEGISLATURE AND CITIZENS OF THE STATE, at 3–4 (1786)
(emphasis in original).
3. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932, 955 (5th Cir. 2006).
4. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §51.803. (West 1997).
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admissions approach, the University’s entering class was 16.9% Hispanic and
4.5% African American.5
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided Gratz v. Bollinger6 and
Grutter v. Bollinger,7 upholding “the use of race as one of many ‘plus factors’ in a
race-blind admissions program that considered the overall individual
contribution of each candidate.” 8 Thereafter, the University tweaked its
admissions program to increase minority enrollment further, with the goal of
achieving a “critical mass” of minority students.9 Under this new program, in
addition to students admitted automatically pursuant to the Top Ten Percent
Plan, the University conducted a holistic review of each applicant’s file to fill the
remaining seats in the entering class that had been set aside for Texas applicants;
that review explicitly took race into consideration, among many other factors.10
Abigail Noel Fisher, a white woman, challenged this holistic review
program, arguing that, in light of minority admissions under the race-blind Top
Ten Percent plan, the holistic review’s consideration of race was
unconstitutional.11 Fisher applied for admission to the University in the fall of
2008. She did not qualify for admission under the Top Ten Percent Plan, under
which 81% of the entering class was admitted. As a result, her application was
considered under the holistic review program; she was one of 17,131 applicants
considered for 1,216 seats set aside for Texas residents in that program. Although

5. As the Court of Appeals noted in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 650–51 (5th
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888, (2015) “[t]he sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan gains
diversity from a fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary education system. The de facto
segregation of schools in Texas enables the Top Ten Percent Plan to increase minorities in the mix,
while ignoring contributions to diversity beyond race.” Ironically, as the Supreme Court pointed out
in Grutter, “even assuming such plans are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from
conducting the individualized assessment necessary to assemble a student body that is not just
racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 340 (2003).
6. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
7. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013)
9. The concept of “critical mass” for minority enrollment in institutions of higher education is
discussed in Grutter and Gratz. Grutter recognized that the University of Michigan Law School had a
legitimate interest in admitting a “critical mass” of minority students for several reasons, including to
avoid racial or ethnic isolation; the Court also noted that a “critical mass” of minority students
“diminish[es] the force of . . . stereotypes.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
10. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d at 637, n.4. The Court of Appeals noted that,
“following the Hopwood v. Texas decision, UT Austin faced a nearly intractable problem: achieving
diversity – including racial diversity – essential to its educational mission, while not facially
considering race even as one of many components of diversity.” Id. at 645 (footnote 65 omitted). Thus,
“[f]oreshadowing Grutter, admission supplementing the Top Ten Percent Plan included factors such
as socioeconomic diversity and family educational achievements but, controlled by Hopwood, it did
not include race. In short, a holistic process sans race controlled the gate for the large percent of
applicants not entering through the Ten Percent Plan.” Id.
11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), and aff’d, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). The
facts relating to Fisher’s challenge are taken from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, affirming summary judgment for the University of Texas at Austin. Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637–639 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888, (2015).
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race was considered in the holistic review, it was not given a numerical value;
“because race is a factor considered in the unique context of each applicant’s
entire experience, it may be a beneficial factor for a minority or a non-minority
student.”12
The holistic review challenged by Fisher did not “function as an open gate
to boost minority headcount for a racial quota. Far from it.”13 Instead, because of
the intense competition for a dwindling number of non-Top Ten Percent Plan
seats for Texas applicants in each entering class, minority students were “underrepresented – and white students . . . over-represented – in holistic review
admissions relative to the program’s impact on each incoming class.”14
The record in Fisher showed that she would not have been admitted to the
University in the fall of 2008 under the holistic program, even if race had not
been considered as a factor.15 Thus, the only avenue Fisher had for admission to
the entering class was a special summer program under which white and
minority applicants were offered provisional admission, “subject to completing
certain academic requirements over the summer.”16 Through that program, four
Hispanic applicants and one African-American applicant with holistic reader
scores lower than Fisher’s score were provisionally admitted. 17 In addition,
however, 168 minority applicants with the same or higher reader scores than
Fisher were denied admission and 42 white applicants with identical or lower
scores than her were admitted, some of whose race may have been taken into
consideration. 18 Fisher’s challenge, however, was directed only at the five
minority applicants who were admitted with lower scores.
Considering how little Fisher personally has at stake in her litigation,19 it
appeared the Supreme Court may have decided to review her case primarily to
hold that any consideration of race in public higher education admissions was
unconstitutional, overturning Grutter 20 and Reagents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 21

12. Id. at 638 (footnote 13 omitted).
13. Id. at 646.
14. Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F. 3d at 639 (“[E]ven if she had received a perfect [score
on her file], she could not have received an offer of admission to the Fall 2008 class. If she had been a
minority, the result would have been the same.”) (footnote omitted).
16. These facts were set out in the University’s Supreme Court brief in 2012. Brief for
Respondents at 15, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
17. Id. at 15–16.
18. Id.
19. In the Fisher litigation on remand from the Supreme Court, the University has argued
strenuously that Fisher lacked standing to maintain her challenge. Brief for Respondents at 17–24,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), No. 14-981 (argued Dec. 9, 2015). The Fifth Circuit said the
University’s “standing arguments carry force, but in our view the actions of the Supreme Court do
not allow our reconsideration.” Fisher, 758 F. 3d at 640 (footnote omitted). She turned down an offer
for admission under a program that would have allowed her to transfer from another school in the
UT System in her sophomore year, if she met certain requirements. Brief for Respondents, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, at 17. Instead, Fisher enrolled at Louisiana State University, from
which she graduated in 2012. Id. Fisher claims her actual damages consist of the $100.00 nonrefundable application fee she paid with her application in 2008. Id. at 18.
20. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Such a result would sanction elite public universities with virtually no black or
Hispanic students, even against the wishes of the universities. As Justice Antonin
Scalia commented during oral argument in Fisher, “I don’t think it stands to
reason that it’s a good thing for the University of Texas to admit as many blacks
as possible.” 22 But, would such a result be consistent with the democratic
purpose of public education? More specifically, in a state such as Texas, for
example, where 50.7% of its population in 2014 was estimated to be Hispanic or
black, would such a result be consistent with the original intent of public
education?
II. DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT
Every American state has a system of public education.23 Many of them
explicitly state in their constitutions or enabling statutes that the purpose of the
system is the “diffusion of knowledge.” Article 7 of the Texas Constitution, for
example, provides for the support and maintenance of a system of public
education. Section 1 of that Article declares that, “[a] general diffusion of
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools.” 24 Neither Texas nor any other state defines “diffusion of
knowledge.” At first blush, the term may appear to be nothing more than the
quaint language of a bygone era, with no contemporary significance. While one
might make such an argument, the original intent of the term is neither a relic
nor currently insignificant.
“Diffusion of knowledge” identifies both the primary purpose of public
education and, as the Texas Constitution suggests, a fundamental function of
democratic government. At a time of racial, ethnic, and religious strife, of historic
levels of income and wealth inequality, we should consider the original meaning
of “diffusion of knowledge” before the Supreme Court sets in stone a
constitutional principle of colorblindness for higher education admissions that is
fundamentally at odds with the original intent of public education.25
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (argued Dec.
9, 2015) (Scalia, J.).
23. All of the state systems of education include institutions of higher education. Twenty-three
states established such institutions in their constitutions. The remaining twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia established state universities by statute.
24. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
25. The Supreme Court heard argument in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), on
December 9, 2015. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (argued Dec. 9, 2015). The issue in
Fisher case is whether the use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be
sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Fisher does not
claim that she was denied admission to the University of Texas because of her race, but that five black
and Latino students who allegedly were less qualified than her were admitted under a program that
set aside 841 spots in the class for Texas students not in the top 10% of their high school graduating
class. Nor does Fisher claim that she necessarily would have been admitted to the University, but for
the admissions of these five students; indeed, there were 42 white students who were equally or less
qualified than her who were admitted, as well as many white students more qualified than her who
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The link between public education and American democracy was forged
at the birth of this nation; however, the leaders of the American Revolution were
not the first to recognize a link between education and government, or even
between education and citizenship. “For democratic theorists, education has
defined not merely citizenship, but democracy itself.” 26 Among the founders,
Thomas Jefferson was one of the foremost proponents of this view; Dumas
Malone called him “the chief prophet of public education in the first half-century
of the Union.”27
Jefferson believed that education was the “sine qua non of a truly viable
democracy, as the inescapable prerequisite to any intellectual rule.”28 In a letter
to George Washington, Jefferson wrote that it was “an axiom in my mind that
our liberty can never be safe but in the hands of the people themselves, and that
too of the people with a certain degree of instruction. That is the business of the
state to effect, and on a general plan.”29
Jefferson’s well-known distrust of government was rooted in his belief
that all governments are susceptible to corruption. History has shown, he
argued, that the best protection a democracy has against such degeneracy is “to
illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more
especially to give them knowledge . . . that they may be enabled to know
ambition under all its shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat
its purposes. . . .” 30 Jefferson put his ultimate faith in public education for
“enlightenment of the people as a whole, or of individuals gathered into a
people.”31 This is the “diffusion of knowledge” that animates public education
and sustains democratic government; moreover, as its expression in the
constitutions of so many states attest, it “is the business of the state to effect, and
on a general plan.”32
As envisioned by Jefferson and others in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the goal of public education was inclusion, not exclusivity or
concentration: “where learning is confined to a few people, we always find
monarchy, aristocracy, and slavery.” 33 To achieve the purpose of public
also were not admitted. See supra note 16 at 15–16. Thus, Fisher’s claim allows for the diffusion of
knowledge among white students less qualified than her, but not among minority students equally or
less qualified.
26. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, A PASSION FOR DEMOCRACY 162 (Princeton Univ. Press 1998).
27. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 280 (1948).
28. GORDON C. LEE, CRUSADE AGAINST IGNORANCE: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON EDUCATION 2 (1961).
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1786) (Boyd,
vol. IX, p. 150). Jefferson’s plan for the diffusion of knowledge in Virginia was similar to the Ten
Percent Plan adopted by Texas in response to the Hopwood decision. See Bill 79 of 1779, Plan for the
“More General Diffusion of knowledge.” Jefferson called his plan, “by far the most important bill in
our whole code . . . . No other sure foundation can be devised for the preservation of freedom and
happiness.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786).
30. Bill 79 of 1779, supra note 29, § 1.
31. LORRAINE SMITH PANGLE AND THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE LEARNING OF LIBERTY: THE
EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 108 (1993).
32. Supra note 29, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1786).
33. Supra note 2 at 3–4 (emphasis in original).
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education in a democratic society, a primary function of the “general plan” of
government must be to remove obstacles to the broad diffusion of knowledge. In
his time, for example, Jefferson believed that poverty was the principal such
obstacle in the racially homogenous country. Consistent with that, he proposed a
public education system for Virginia that had as its primary goal education of the
poor. Because of its paramount importance, Jefferson assumed that the wealthy
would pay for the education of their own children; as a result, by his plan
knowledge would be diffused among the people as a whole.
Jefferson argued that, by eliminating poverty as an obstacle to the
diffusion of knowledge, Virginia could claim for its people “those talents which
nature has sown as liberally among the poor as the rich, but which perish
without use, if not sought for and cultivated.”34 In 1813, Jefferson summed up his
view of the importance of public education in a letter to John Adams in which he
expressed his hope that the public education system someday would be the
“keystone of the arch of our government.”35
The broad diffusion of knowledge also serves to assimilate diverse groups
of people into a functioning democracy. The diffusion of knowledge seeks to
overcome those indelible differences among citizens, such as religion, poverty,
and nationality, that inherently threaten democratic self-government. 36 In
discussing his proposal for a national university to bring together students from
different backgrounds, regions, and national origins, for example, George
Washington said, “the more homogenous our citizens can be made in these
particulars, the greater will be our prospect of permanent Union.” Benjamin
Rush made a similar point when he argued that a system of public education was
important in Pennsylvania, “while our citizens are composed of the natives of so
many different kingdoms in Europe. Our schools of learning, by producing one
general and uniform system of education, will render the mass of the people
more homogenous and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceable
government.”37
We now take for granted that education is an important responsibility of
government, “rank[ing] at the very apex of the function of a state,”38 but we have
lost sight of diffusion of knowledge as the explicit goal.39 Divorced from that
purpose, however, public education ceases to perform the democratic function
expected of it. That fact has nowhere been more apparent than in the country’s

34. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Queries 14 and 19, 146–49, 164–65 (1784).
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813).
36. Although it was not relevant at the time the founders were writing, race also is such a
difference; indeed, today, it is one of the principal differences that divides Americans and threatens
our democracy.
37. BENJAMIN RUSH, OF THE MODE OF EDUCATION PROPER IN A REPUBLIC (1798), reprinted in The
Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush 87, 88 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 2008).
38. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (1972).
39. As the author of a recent book notes, “In the years following World War II, as education
became more professionalized and vocationalized, it was increasingly decoupled from the life and
practice of democracy. Today, while education is widely discussed, the focus on performance,
standards, global competition, and outcomes has largely eclipsed the linkage to citizenship.”
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, A PASSION FOR DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN ESSAYS 161 (1998) (note omitted).
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treatment of the public education of black Americans.
III. EXCLUSION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS FROM THE “HEADY VISION”
The Revolutionary leaders who believed public education was
intrinsically linked to democratic government had in mind a society that was
racially homogenous. “It was a heady vision of a new world in which rich and
poor, German and French, Protestant and Catholic—but not black and red—
would take part in the great experiment.”40 As a result, Jefferson and others had
no occasion to consider the implications for diffusion of knowledge in the kind of
multiracial democracy we have today. As James Conant wrote of Jefferson’s
ideas on public education, “[o]ne might note in passing an assumption here
about the diffusion of talent [among the people] which reflects the homogeneity
of the white population.”41
The exclusion of black people from the “heady vision of a new world”
was not inadvertent, but by design, and continued long after formal slavery
ended. One of the principal characteristics of American slavery was a systematic
effort to keep slaves in a state of ignorance.42 As one white man said, referring to
Fredrick Douglass: “If you teach that nigger how to read, there would be no
keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become
unmanageable, and of no value to his master. As to himself, it would do him no
good, but a great deal of harm. It would make him discontented and unhappy.”43
Following the Civil War, whites sought to perpetuate the ignorance
enforced on slaves in order to disenfranchise them and thereby preserve white
control of government, predicated on their self-declared racial supremacy. This
gave credence to Jefferson’s deeply pessimistic view that, even after the
inevitable abolition of slavery, the country could not “retain and incorporate the
blacks into the state,” because “[d]eep rooted prejudices entertained by the
whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have
sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and

40. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783–1876 105
(HarperCollins 1980).
41. JAMES CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 8 (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1962).
42. As one scholar recently noted, despite his racism and hypocrisy, Jefferson still advanced a
view of democracy that “embraced a participatory politics that opened the way to struggle for rights
within rather than against the political system.” BENJAMIN R. BARBER, A PASSION FOR DEMOCRACY:
AMERICAN ESSAYS 167 (Princeton Univ. Press 1998). Indeed, after the Civil War, Jefferson’s vision of
democracy motivated both the freed slaves who embraced it and the white supremacists who sought
to subvert it. One hungered for education as the way to citizenship and the other sought to limit
citizenship by limiting education. There were advocates of public education during the ante-bellum
period who included blacks and Indians. Most of these, however, envisioned a role for blacks that
was less equal than the role of whites; therefore, the education that was appropriate was more
limited. None of these advocates of limited education seemed to consider the inconsistency of that
concept with the concept of democratic government. The conclusion is that none of them could
imagine a society in which people they considered socially inferior would be full citizens. That view
prevailed after the Civil War and likely is a view shared by many today.
43. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN
SLAVE, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF 33 (1845).
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many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions
which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other
race.”44
Jefferson’s solution, however, was not a society divided into two classes of
citizens based on race; rather, he called for deportation of the freed slaves to a
place where they could be “free and independent people.” But before that
happened, the state had a duty to educate free black children “at the public
expense, to tillage, arts or sciences, according to their geniuses, till the females
should be eighteen and the males twenty-one years of age. . . .”45 This proposal
was consistent with Jefferson’s view that diffusion of knowledge was
indispensable to self-government; it paralleled his plan for the education of poor
whites in Virginia, described as, “rak[ing] the best geniuses from the rubbish and
train[ing] Americans to accept the leadership of the good and the just.”46
It would have been inconsistent with his views on education for Jefferson
to suggest that, after slavery, black citizens should be excluded from the
diffusion of knowledge that he envisioned for America’s slave society; indeed, it
would have been irreconcilable with true democracy and would have accelerated
the inevitable racial degeneration that he feared. Freedom for former slaves
without diffusion of knowledge still would have been slavery, but under a
different name. Thus, contrary to the course actually taken after the Civil War,
the only legitimate course for education in a racially diverse democracy would
have been to identify and develop the talents of the new black citizens,
“according to their geniuses.” 47 Instead, the country took a different,
undemocratic route; relegating its second class black citizens to a second-class
education under the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. 48
The country did not make a systematic effort to educate African
Americans to the full extent of their talents and under the same circumstances
that the white majority were educated until the early 1970s.49 Many now argue,
44. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIV (1787), reprinted in JUAN F. PEREA
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 105–10 (2007). Jefferson’s
explanation undoubtedly reflected his concept of civil society, which depended upon “the
willingness to get along with others for the sake of peace and prosperity.” Gordon S. Wood, Thomas
Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of a Civil Society, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2133, 2144 (1996). Between
black and white citizens, there would not have been the “natural feelings of love and benevolence
between equal individuals” that characterized a republican society. Id. at 2145.
45. Thomas Jefferson, supra note 44. Jefferson’s inclusion of “sciences” in the areas of education
indicates that he had in mind higher education and not just “tillage.”
46. Bennett Weaver, Thomas Mann: Political Thinker, 52 Q. REV. MICH. ALUMNUS 44, at 46–47
(Autumn 1945) (internal citations omitted).
47. As noted, when Jefferson proposed educating the freed slaves for deportation and
subsequent self-government, he included higher education. See Thomas Jefferson, supra note 44, n. 42.
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49. The concept of “affirmative action” was first articulated by President John F. Kennedy in
1961, when he issued Executive Order 10925, requiring contractors with the federal government to
“take affirmative action” to ensure that racial minorities were employed on federal projects. Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959–1963). In 1974, the California State Legislature adopted a
resolution calling on its state university system to take race-conscious action to ensure that the racial
composition of its student body reflected the racial composition of graduating high school seniors in
California each year. See generally, Joseph O. Jewell, An Unfinished Mission: Affirmative Action, Minority
ET AL.,
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however, fewer than fifty years later, that the time has come to abandon such
efforts and to decide whom to educate on the basis of objective qualification,
without consideration of race. 50 As Jefferson observed, however, the habits,
opinions, and expectations that are the products of our long history of difficult
race relations are not so easily overcome; it still is necessary to make a deliberate
race-conscious effort to ensure racial inclusion. More important still, a race-blind
allocation of higher education would not spread “the opportunities and
advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the
different orders of the people.”51
Diffusion of knowledge is not a remedial device. Rather, it is the end that
public education was conceived to achieve. A concentration of education among
white or any identifiable group of citizens, to the exclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities, undermines that goal, regardless of whether the concentration results
from discrimination. No one disputes today that denying students admission to
public universities because of their race violates the constitution; it also subverts
democracy, although we have not always acknowledged that fact. In the same
way, the race-blind allocation of public education, which results in the exclusion
of racial and other minorities, also deprives government of the ability to ensure
the broad education of citizens, including insular racial and ethnic minorities.
Ensuring such broad diffusion of knowledge is a fundamental function of
democratic government, reflected in the constitutions of states like Virginia and
Texas.
The diffusion of knowledge is especially important today in face of
ongoing national debates about race-conscious government decisions and the
politically disintegrating effect on undocumented immigration here of people of
color and refugees from wars in the Middle East. As the country moves
inexorably towards a national population composed of large blocs of different
racial, ethnic, and non-Christian citizens, there is legitimate concern about
balkanization and its effect of our democracy.52 But race-blindness in allocating
public higher education promotes balkanization, not democracy. Today, race and
ethnicity, in addition to religion and income disparity, lie at the fault lines of
American democracy, as the 2016 campaigns for president in both parties
demonstrated. Facing such a current state of affairs, the wide diffusion of
knowledge through public education arguably is even more critical to
Admissions, and the Politics of Mission at the University of California, 1868-1997, Journal of Negro
Education, Vol. 69, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2000) at 41–46. The resolution set a six-year goal for
compliance. The program was challenged almost immediately as reverse discrimination against more
qualified white students, culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents of U. of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A similar affirmative action effort at the University of Washington’s
system was challenged even earlier in DeFunis v. Odegaad, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
50. This kind of purely objective admissions policy has never been used for college admissions.
In Fisher, for example, her challenge to race-conscious admissions was limited to the five minority
students who had lower scores that her, not the substantially greater number of white applicants who
were admitted with lower scores. Nor does she consider the fact that there were substantially more
minority applicants with scores equal to or greater than her score who also were rejected.
51. MASS. CONST. Ch. 5, § 2.
52. See, e.g., JOHN J. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF AMERICANS: HOW MULTICULTURALISM HAS
UNDERMINED AMERICA’S ASSIMILATION ETHIC (1998).
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preservation of democratic values than it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries when the primary concern was creating a democracy in a racially
homogenous society.
As a result of disconnecting public education from its original democratic
purpose, the current debate about race-conscious admissions erroneously focuses
on the individual rights of applicants.53 As the Fisher case makes clear, the debate
focuses upon the relative “objective” qualifications of white and minority
applicants (but not the relative qualifications of competing white applicants)
seeking admission to elite public universities, and gives no consideration to
diffusion of knowledge as a goal.54
Those who advocate race-blind admissions argue that race-conscious
admissions unfairly “prefer” less qualified minority applicants over more
qualified white applicants such as Abigail Fisher.55 Such preferences, they argue,
unlawfully discriminate against the more qualified white applicants on the basis
of race. This argument does not apply to less qualified white applicants who are
preferred over more qualified applicants, where the “preference” is not due to
race but some other factor or factors important to achieving some goal of the
system.56 Stated differently, if race is not taken into consideration, the number of
white students enrolled in public universities would increase, but not necessarily
the overall qualifications of the students admitted. Thus, the inevitable effect of a
race-blind admissions policy would be relatively more concentration of
knowledge among whites and consequently less diffusion among citizens as a
whole. Nevertheless, advocates of such a policy argue that admission to public
universities should be racially neutral and fair.57 Such an argument in favor of
53. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); and Hopwood, 78 F. 3d 932, 955 (5th Cir.
2006).
54. This argument does not depend upon the race, ethnicity, or religion of the most qualified
applicants. The same argument applies if Asian-Americans from Korea or China or African
Americans of West Indian descent were the most qualified applicants disproportionately represented
in the applicant pool.
55. Proponents of such race-conscious decisions also include the consideration of gender. This is
done often to broaden the appeal of affirmative action by including white women among its
beneficiaries. But the disparity in the so-called objective qualifications of white women and white
men is not significant. Thus, to whatever extent white women “benefit” from affirmative action, it
does not entail any significant preference over more qualified men.
56. As noted, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, only five minority applicants with lower
scores than Fisher were admitted to the special summer program for which she may have qualified
for admission in 2008. Supra note 16. On the other hand, 168 minority applicants with the same or
higher reader scores than Fisher were denied admission and 42 white applicants with identical or
lower scores than her were admitted. Id.
57. Opponents of race-conscious affirmative action ironically have succeeded in casting their
cause in the apparently neutral terms of “fairness” and “equal opportunity.” One reason that defense
of the color line is more sophisticated today is that its defenders speak not in terms of racial
supremacy but of objective merit, that has the effect of casting black and Latino students in the role of
less qualified students. They use terms such as “fairness” and “equal opportunity” to justify the
advantage white students have in this approach. In this way, they have turned things on their heads.
See Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism, or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1993,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/11/reverse-racism-or-how-the-pot-got-tocall-the-kettle-black/304638 (“‘Individualism,’ ‘fairness,’ ‘merit’—these three words are continually
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individual interests ignores the original intent of public education.58
A race-blind admissions policy elevates individual interests over the
fundamentally more important public interest in the diffusion of knowledge. The
implication of such a policy is that the state has no legitimate interest in ensuring
the education of racial minorities; that, if necessary to give academically more
qualified white applicants the best chance of being admitted to elite public
colleges and universities, the state must sacrifice the education of academically
less qualified racial minorities in those institutions. In effect, the contention is
that a multiracial democracy can survive with an educational system that
concentrates public education in its elite institutions among whites, more
objectively qualified or not. Stripped of its varnish, a race-blind admissions
policy directly conflicts with the original core purpose of public education. And,
in a society increasingly composed of distinct racial and ethnic groups, such a
policy in the long run undermines democracy.59
Just as Jefferson argued that government in a racially homogenous society
had an affirmative responsibility to prepare the poor “by education for defeating
the competition of wealth and birth for public trusts,” government in a
multiracial, multiethnic, and diverse religious society has a similar responsibility
to prepare its racial, ethnic, and religious minorities by education for defeating
the competition of a white minority for public trusts. That is essential for our
evolving democracy. Indeed, ensuring the diffusion of knowledge among the
people as a whole must be the threshold consideration of public education, not
an afterthought pursued only indirectly.
The diffusion of knowledge requires a race-conscious admissions policy
misappropriated by bigots who have learned that they need not put on a white hood or bar access to
the ballot box in order to secure their ends. Rather, they need only clothe themselves in a vocabulary
plucked from its historical context and made into the justification for attitudes and policies they
would not acknowledge if frankly named.”). In effect, these latter day defenders suggest that if racial
minorities feel further victimized by race-blind admissions, it is “solely because [they] choose[] to put
that construction upon it.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 551.
58. Of course, the admissions process is much more complex than this argument suggests. Even
without race consciousness, less qualified applicants may and often are admitted in favor of more
qualified applicants. Besides race, numerous other factors affect whether an applicant is admitted “in
turn,” even among the most qualified applicants, resulting in relatively less qualified applicants
being admitted or preferred over relatively more qualified applicants. These non-race factors include
geography, preferences for the children of alumni, preferences for the children of significant donors,
and special talents. In some cases, these “neutral” factors also result in the admission of some
minority applicants out of turn, although race is not the basis for the decision. The success of the
current anti-affirmative action forces in controlling the debate is reflected in the fact that they have
been successful in isolating race as the only objectionable basis for such out-of-turn admissions. There
is no inquiry into why more that 40 white applicants in the University of Texas at Austin’s summer
program in 2008 were admitted with the same or lower reader scores than Fisher or why 163 minority
applicants with the same or better scores were rejected. Supra note 16.
59. Justice O’Connor mentions diffusion of knowledge in her opinion in Grutter, although she
does not explain it. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (“the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through
public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or
ethnicity.”). It is not clear what she intended by saying it had to be “accessible.” That might suggest
that diffusion of knowledge is satisfied if the University provides a non-discriminatory opportunity
for admissions, rather than it being an affirmative obligation the University has actually to admit a
critical mass of racial and ethnic minorities.
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to preserve the link between public education and democracy. Otherwise, the
government has an obligation to articulate a different purpose for public
education that elevates the interests of individuals over that of citizens as a
whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal fight over race-conscious admissions is primarily a fight about
who gets into elite colleges and universities. It is not by accident that the public
universities that have been targeted by opponents of race-conscious admissions
have been the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Michigan,
and the University of Texas at Austin, crown jewels of their respective state
systems of higher education. To justify the exclusion of minority students from
these institutions, some scholars and conservative commentators recently have
espoused the so-called “mismatch” effect of race-conscious admissions.60 This
hypothesis, that less prepared minority students admitted to elite institutions
would personally be better off if they attended less elite universities, is
essentially a twenty-first century formulation of the nineteenth century separate
but equal doctrine; a way to satisfy a state’s obligation to diffuse knowledge,
while preserving placements for white students in the elite institutions they have
historically dominated.61
Justice Scalia referred controversially to this “mismatch hypothesis”
during the Fisher argument: “there are those who contend that it does not benefit
African-Americans to get them into the University of Texas where they do not do
well, as opposed to having them go to a less-advanced school, a slower-track
school where they do well.” 62 This argument suggests that the diffusion of

60. Rick Sander, An emerging scholarly consensus on mismatch and affirmative action (ideologues not
welcome),
The
Volokh
Conspiracy,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Dec.
10,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/10/an-emergingscholarly-consensus-on-mismatch-and-affirmative-action-ideologues-not-welcome/;
Anemona Hartocollis, With Remarks in Affirmative Action Case, Scalia Steps Into ‘Mismatch’ Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/with-remarks-in-affirmativeaction-case-scalia-steps-into-mismatch-debate.html?_r=0;
Conor Friedersdorf, Does Affirmative Action Create Mismatches Between Students and Universities?, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/theneedlessly-polarized-mismatch-theory-debate/420321/
61. Opponents of race-conscious admissions do not oppose diffusion of knowledge generally;
their fire is directed only at diffusion of knowledge for minority students, if their race must be taken
into consideration to identify them. Abigail Fisher did not challenge the admission of forty-one white
students who were less qualified than her; rather, she challenged only the admission of five black and
Latino students who were less qualified. Her challenge also assumed that the University had valid
reasons for rejecting minority applicants in the same summer program who were more qualified than
her. Professor Richard Sander, one of the principal proponents of the mismatch hypothesis of
affirmative action, acknowledges that the theory also would apply to non-minorities (“The
“mismatch hypothesis” contends that any person (certainly not just minorities) can be adversely
affected if she attends a school where her level of academic preparation is substantially lower than
that of her typical classmate.”). Rich Sander, supra note 60. Sander and others, like Abigail Fisher, are
just not as bothered when white students are the beneficiaries.
62. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, Transcript of Oral Argument, at 67 (Dec. 9,
2015) (Scalia, J.).
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knowledge can be satisfied by steering minority students to slower-track schools;
that, unsurprisingly, was also the premise of the separate but equal doctrine.
At virtually the same time Justice Scalia was contemplating sending
minority students to “slower track schools,” he ironically was lamenting the lack
of a certain kind of diversity on the Supreme Court itself. In his dissent in the
Court’s same-sex marriage decisions, Justice Scalia wrote “separately to call
attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy. . . .To allow the policy
question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select,
patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even
more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social
transformation without representation.”63 Scalia’s alarm was over the fact that all
of his colleagues on the Court attended either Yale or Harvard Law Schools
(Justice Ginsburg attended both Harvard and Columbia). But he just as well
could have been talking about social transformation without racial or ethnic
representation.64
When Heman Sweatt sought admission to the University of Texas Law
School at Austin on February 26, 1946, the Law School rejected his application
because he was African American.65 On May 16, 1946, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund filed a lawsuit on Sweatt’s behalf, challenging his rejection for admission as
a violation of the Constitution.66 In response, the Texas legislature authorized
Prairie View State Normal and Industrial College, one of the Texas schools
established to educate black students, to offer the same graduate and
professional courses offered to whites by the University of Texas. Seizing on this,
the trial court held that Texas had satisfied its obligation under the separate but
equal doctrine. 67 According to the court, Prairie View offered Sweatt “[the]
privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law substantially
equivalent to those offered by the State to white students at the University of
Texas.”68 The Supreme Court summarily rejected this disingenuous claim:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study
in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange
of views with which the law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is
willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body members of the racial

63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Dispute Justice Scalia’s lament in Obergefell about the lack of one kind of diversity on the
Court, racial and ethnic diversity on the Court is attributed to Justices Thomas and Sotomayor having
attended the elite Yale Law School. It is doubtful that we will see another Justice like Thurgood
Marshall who graduated from a historically black law school, which today some might call a “slower
track school. In Marshall’s time, however, schools such as Howard attracted many of the most
qualified black students like Marshall who, because of their race, were denied admission to flagship
state schools such as the University of Maryland.
65. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
66. Application for Writ of Mandamus, Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (May 16, 1946),
http://www.houseofrussell.com/legalhistory/sweatt/docs/svppldng.htm.
67. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
68. Supra note 66.
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groups which number 85% of the population of the State and include most of the
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a
substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that
the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would
receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.69

What was true in 1950 is true in 2016. Elite universities and colleges are
where community, state, and national leaders are trained. Exclusion of minority
students from those institutions denies them that path to leadership. It also
denies our evolving democracy the benefits of a racially and ethnically diverse
education in those institutions, one of the principal benefits of the diffusion of
knowledge. George Washington noted that the “daily intercourse and amity
between northerners and southerners” during the Revolutionary War was the
“best antidote” for the “evil” of sectional jealousies in the country.70 The country
would derive the same benefit, he argued, from a national university. “What but
the mixing of people from different parts of the United States during the War
rubbed off these impressions? A century in the ordinary intercourse would not
accomplish what seven years associated in arms did; but that ceasing, prejudices
are beginning to revive again, and will never be eradicated so effectually by any
other means as the intimate intercourse of characters in early life. . . .”71 That
essentially is the diversity rationale for affirmative action in higher education,
embraced in Grutter.72 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was called
diffusion of knowledge.
On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas’
limited use of race in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II).73 In his majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that, “a university is in large part defined by
those intangible qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness. Considerable deference is owed to a university in
defining those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are
central to its identity and educational mission.” 74 Although Justice Kennedy’s
opinion does not directly mention diffusion of knowledge, its rationale is fully
consistent with that goal.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton. (Sept. 1, 1796).
Id.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, 579 U.S. ____ (U.S. June 23, 2016).
Id., slip op. at 19 (internal citations omitted).

